NILI: Israeli Unit Tasked With Hunting Hamas Members Responsible For Oct. 7 Attacks

Israeli media are reporting that a special unit of security and intelligence agents has been set up to track down and eliminate the Hamas members responsible for the deadly October 7 attacks in southern Israel. The operation is reminiscent of the plot to find the Palestinian militants who murdered 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics.

Members of the NILI unit are said to include both Shin Bet and Mossad agents.

Israeli media have been reporting over the past week that Shin Bet (Israel’s internal security service) along with the Mossad intelligence service have set up a special unit to track down the Hamas members who organised the killing of more than 1,400 Israelis during the deadly October 7 attack. The unit is reportedly known as NILI – a Hebrew acronym for the Biblical phrase “Netzah Yisrael Lo Yeshaker,” or “The Eternal One of Israel will not lie”.

To date, neither NILI’s existence nor its activities have been confirmed by the Israeli government. But Ahron Bregman, an Israeli political scientist at King’s College London who spent six years in the Israeli army, is fairly confident the special unit is real.

“Shin Bet along with Mossad formed a special operations centre tasked with tracking down and killing members of Hamas that entered Israel and massacred Israelis on 7 October,” says Bregman. “I know from a reliable source that this forum already exists.”

The formation of such a unit would not be surprising, says Shahin Modarres, a specialist in Iran and Israeli intelligence at the International Team for the Study of Security Verona (ITSS).

“Mossad’s charter specifies that its missions include neutralising threats to Israel and exacting revenge,” he said. “In other words, tracking down Hamas fighters is perfectly within the remit of these spies.”

The perception that the October 7 assault was partly the result of an intelligence failure is all the more reason that Israel would launch this kind of operation, says Modarres; the failure left Shin Bet and Mossad with no choice but to try to redeem themselves.

Operation Wrath of God
NILI’s ambitions would be similar to Operation Wrath of God, considered the archetype of Mossad retribution operations and popularised by the 2005 Steven Speilberg film, “Munich.”

“After the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics [by the Palestinian militant group Black September], Mossad tracked down those involved in the massacre, killing them one by one. This is what is now to be expected from NILI,” says Bregman.

The precedent of Operation Wrath of God also gives us an idea of the resources the Israeli state is likely to mobilise for hunting terrorists – up to five different teams of spies and assassins were supported financially and logistically over two decades to track down and eliminate Black September members and those who helped them.

Israel set up a top-secret unit within Mossad’s undercover operations section dubbed Kidon (“bayonet” in English). It remains the flagship of the Israeli secret service’s assassination squad and is responsible for most of the Black September killings. Kidon agents, who are also known for targeting Iranian nuclear scientists, will likely take part in NILI, says Modarres.

Unlike other spy services, Kidon’s modus operandi of Kidon is not to kill as discreetly as possible. Indeed, their goal is to make a statement – often using explosives.

“They want to send a signal to other terrorist groups and often stage their assassinations,” Modarres says.

Kidon agents are suspected of assassinating Iranian nuclear engineer Darioush Rezaeinejad, who was killed by gunmen on a motorcycle after picking up his child from school in Tehran in 2011.

The 1978 death of Palestinian activist Wadia Haddad is also the suspected work of Kidon agents. According to differing accounts, either Haddad’s toothpaste or some Belgian chocolate given to him by a friend was poisoned.

But the comparison with Operation Wrath of God has its limits.

“The main difference is that NILI will take place while Israel is at war with Hamas,” says Modarres, who argues tracking down Hamas fighters hiding in or underneath Gaza will be more complicated to organise, as it is likely to take place in parallel with the broader military operation.

“I don’t think NILI agents will go in during the first phase of the ground operation, as it would be too dangerous for them,” says Modarres. “They will go in once the purely military objectives have been achieved, to eliminate those who have managed to survive.”

Bregman believes that NILI agents will go in at the same time as the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). “They will have two key missions,” he says. “First, to try to locate the remaining Israeli hostages and, if possible, release them. Second, try to locate Hamas terrorists who killed Israelis on 7th October and kill them.”

In Gaza and beyond
The most obvious targets of Israeli assassins are members of the Nukhba force, the elite corps of fighters of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas. These Hamas commandos are the suspected perpetrators of the October 7 attack.

The brains behind the attack are also on the list. The elusive head of the Qassam Brigades, Mohammed Deif, and his No. 2 Marwan Issa as well as the head of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, are all suspected to be hiding out in the enclave.

Mossad’s involvement also offers a clue to NILI operations. It means the assassinations will not be restricted to the Gaza Strip, Bregman says.

“The fact that the body includes Mossad means that Israel will also go after Hamas members who are not in the Gaza Strip, but also living in places such as Qatar and Turkey,” he says.

“I refer to people such as Khaled Meshaal (the influential former leader of Hamas) and Ismail Haniyeh (the chairman of the Hamas political bureau) who, I’m pretty sure, will be looking over their shoulder and for good reason,” adds Bregman.

And the list of targets is likely to grow as the NILI operation continues.

“NILI members will draw up lists of individuals to target as they go along, and it will have to be validated at the highest level of government,” explains Modarres. But not as high as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself, “so that he can plead that he didn’t know about it”, he adds.

A certain distance must be maintained between elected officials and the intelligence services, as this kind of operation can be very risky for the government, Bregman says.

“The Mossad will have to act carefully. The last time they tried to assassinate Khaled [Meshaal] in Amman [in 1997], they failed, and their combatants were arrested by the Jordanians. This then led to a terrible crisis with Jordan and Netanyahu.”

Tel Aviv then had to agree to release prisoners, including the founder of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Hassan Yassin.

Yassin was assassinated by the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip seven years later.